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In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court began contemplating 
how the First Amendment’s commitment to “the freedom of 
speech” should protect the right of students to introduce their own 
ideas into the schoolhouse.1  This constitutional question ex-
tended well beyond the matter addressed in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, because that opinion—momen-
tous though it was—held simply that students could refuse to re-
cite the Pledge of Allegiance.2  But Barnette did not establish that 
students possessed an affirmative right to advance their own opin-
ions, on topics of their own selection, much less in the face of 
school officials’ objections.  The right to sit out, in other words, 
did not necessarily confer the right to speak out.  
This Article examines the history of student rights to affirm-
ative speech, with a focus on threats facing those rights that ap-
pear on the horizon.  First, as it must, this story begins with the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District.3  The Article analyzes the 
case’s background, emphasizes the majority’s broad conception 
of citizenship, and illuminates the opinion’s deep doctrinal ambi-
guity.  Turning to the dissent, the Article highlights Justice 
Black’s narrow conception of citizenship, examines possible 
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  I am grateful to Professor Mark Killenbeck and
the University of Arkansas Law School for inviting me to deliver the Hartman Hotz Lecture 
in Fayetteville, Arkansas, on November 1, 2019.  This Article is excerpted and adapted from 
my book-length examination of students’ constitutional rights, The Schoolhouse Gate: Pub-
lic Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind (Pantheon Books, 
2019).  Kevin Kennedy provided invaluable assistance with condensing this book excerpt 
into a law review article. 
1. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969).
2. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626, 628-29, 642 (1943).
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
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motivations for his unusually strident opinion, and demonstrates 
that Justice Black’s message resonated more with the American 
people than did the Court’s opinion.  By marshaling contempora-
neous public opinion data, it becomes clear that Tinker should be 
understood as an opinion that successfully vindicated constitu-
tional rights in the face of counter-majoritarian opposition. 
Second, the Article assesses the strength of Tinker today, ar-
guing that scholars have incorrectly dismissed its continuing sig-
nificance.  Admittedly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected 
students’ speech claims post-Tinker.4  But those decisions should 
not be mistaken for indicating that Tinker is now a dead letter.  
After recovering Tinker’s contemporary vitality, the Article con-
cludes by identifying two major areas that require renewed judi-
cial attention in the fight to protect student speech rights.  A brief 
conclusion follows.  
II. TINKER AS A
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DECISION 
In 1965, a small group of students in Des Moines, Iowa—
including John Tinker (15 years old) and Mary Beth Tinker (13 
years old)—formed a plan to protest the Vietnam War by wearing 
black armbands to their various schools.5  They hoped that the 
armbands would spark conversations about their views and help 
in some modest way to mobilize antiwar sentiment.6  When plans 
of the impending protest leaked, however, Des Moines school of-
ficials hastily arranged a meeting to create a policy announcing 
that pupils wearing armbands in school would be suspended until 
they agreed to remove the offending pieces of cloth.7  This policy 
was necessary, the officials maintained, in order to avoid disrup-
tions they believed would result from the protest.8  In addition to 
learning that some students intended to wear nonblack armbands 
4. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393, 409-10 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 
(1986). 
5. JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. DES MOINES
AND THE 1960S 1-5 (1997). 
6. Id. at 4.
7. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
8. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 6.
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as a sort of counter-protest, the officials noted that a former Des 
Moines student had been killed in Vietnam and expressed concern 
that his friends who remained in school would create a volatile, 
hot-tempered environment.9  The antiwar students, undeterred, 
proceeded with their plans.10  John Tinker managed to wear his 
armband at school through lunchtime, before a teacher finally in-
structed him to report to the principal’s office for discipline.11  
During his half-day at school, several different groups of students 
alternately ridiculed him for wearing the armband and beseeched 
him to remove it.12  Like her brother, Mary Beth Tinker wore her 
armband for much of the school day—until she attracted the no-
tice of her mathematics teacher, who had dedicated the entire pre-
vious day of class to condemning student demonstrators and to 
announcing that he would eject anyone wearing an armband from 
his classroom.13  Throughout the day, her classmates repeatedly 
encouraged her to discard the armband before she got into trou-
ble—including at least twice during classes.14  Despite the sus-
pensions, all three students remained steadfast in their convic-
tions, and did not return to school until January, when their 
scheduled period of protest had concluded.15  The student protes-
tors filed a lawsuit contending that their suspensions violated the 
First Amendment right of free expression, and thus set in motion 
what would eventually culminate in the Supreme Court’s most 
consequential student rights opinion in its entire history.16  
In Tinker, the Supreme Court, by a 7–2 margin, vindicated 
the right of students to express their views in school.17 Justice Abe 
9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 n.3.
10. Id. at 504.
11. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 23.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 19-20.
14. Id.
15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
16. For further background information on Tinker, see JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 1-15,
29-66; Jamin B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The Triumph and Unrealized
Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193, 1193-1201 (2009); John W. John-
son, Behind the Scenes in Iowa’s Great Case: What Isn’t in the Official Record of Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 473, 473-80
(2000).
17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504-06.
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Fortas issued the majority’s opinion in February 1969.18  Fortas 
opened by asserting that the Supreme Court had held for nearly 
five decades that students retained First Amendment rights in 
school—a claim that he bolstered by citing Meyer v. Nebraska,19 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,20 and Barnette.21  Fortas advanced this 
proposition in stirring language, using a turn of phrase that not 
only became a staple of judicial opinions, but even entered the 
larger national culture: “It can hardly be argued that . . .  students 
. . . shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”22  
If Tinker were memorable only for containing that sentence, the 
opinion would nevertheless rank high on the list of the Court’s 
momentous defenses of students’ constitutional rights, as that lan-
guage established the fundamental terms of debate for subsequent 
cases.  But Tinker also held great significance beyond that lone 
sentence.  
Two additional, closely-related points in Tinker’s conceptu-
alization of student rights demand attention.  First, Fortas made 
clear that the state—through its public schools—could not pre-
vent students from expressing particular ideas simply because 
their message may counter the state’s own preferred message.23  
That the Des Moines school district sought to prohibit students 
from expressing an antiwar viewpoint—when it otherwise per-
mitted students to express their viewpoints on a whole range of 
issues—rendered the policy constitutionally dubious, according 
to Fortas.24  “In our system, state-operated schools may not be 
enclaves of totalitarianism,” he wrote.25  “School officials do not 
possess absolute authority over their students . . . . In our system, 
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only 
that which the State chooses to communicate.”26  Second, linking 
the opinion to a broad notion of citizenship, Fortas emphasized 
18. Id. at 504.
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923).
20. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925).
21. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 534-35 (1943).
22. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
23. See id. at 509-11.
24. See id. at 510-11.
25. Id. at 511.
26. Id.
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that it would be particularly unwise for a society that values un-
inhibited public debate to permit schools to suppress views, as 
today’s students will soon assume responsibility for maintaining 
tomorrow’s civic discourse.27  Some of the most essential learn-
ing that occurs in schools happens not during teacher-led class-
room instruction, but during “personal intercommunication 
among the students,” interactions that Fortas affirmed as embod-
ying “an inevitable . . . [and] an important part of the educational 
process.”28  
Tinker did not suggest, of course, that schools invariably vi-
olated the First Amendment if they placed limitations on student 
speech.  Fortas’s opinion pointedly observed that the speech at 
issue in Tinker did not involve “the length of skirts or the type of 
clothing, . . . hair style, or deportment”—matters that began to roil 
schools and courts during the 1960s.29  While Fortas’s opinion did 
not go so far as to hold that schools could sanction students with 
impunity in those areas, Tinker did make clear that it regarded 
those issues as distinct from the matter at hand.30  
In what instances did the Supreme Court affirmatively au-
thorize schools to prohibit student speech?  Here, Tinker con-
tained considerable ambiguity, as the opinion can be understood 
to contain three competing approaches for regulating student 
speech.  While the Court left no doubt that it believed that the Des 
Moines school officials overstepped their bounds as measured by 
any of these three potential tests, Tinker’s ambiguity as to what 
measure actually governed student speech would beset educators 
and judges alike in subsequent years.  
On Tinker’s most speech-restrictive reading, school officials 
may prohibit student expression if they can articulate reasonable 
grounds for predicting that the speech will meaningfully hinder 
school operations.31  In Fortas’s language, “[T]he record does not 
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
27. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511-12.
28. Id. at 512.
29. Id. at 507-08.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 509.
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interference with school activities.”32  This interpretation has 
clearly been the most influential in lower courts.33   
On Tinker’s more demanding intermediate interpretation, 
however, school officials could not censor speech on merely the 
reasonable prediction of disruption; instead, the relevant inquiry 
would center on whether the controverted speech actually inter-
fered with school activities.34  “When he is in the cafeteria, or on 
the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,” 
Fortas wrote, “he may express his opinions, even on controversial 
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘mate-
rially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without 
colliding with the rights of others.”35  Fortas, assessing Tinker’s 
facts through this prism, conceded that some students directed un-
kind remarks toward the armband wearers outside of class.36  But 
he noted that the school witnessed no threats of violence—let 
alone violent acts—and that schoolwork had not been compro-
mised.37  The virtually nonexistent record of actual disruption 
could hardly justify the schools’ decision to silence student 
speech.  
Finally, on Tinker’s least speech-restrictive reading, school 
officials could not justify prohibiting student expression based on 
their classmates’ disruptive reactions to the speech, but instead 
must look to whether the speakers themselves disrupted school 
activities.38  While students who espouse “unpopular view-
point[s]” may create “discomfort and unpleasantness,” Tinker 
maintained, educators may not censor expression out of a desire 
to avoid those sensations.39  To the contrary, protecting dissident 
speech was, in Fortas’s telling, intimately connected to the very 
core of American identity:  
32. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
33. See Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student
Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1285, 1293 (2008). 
34. Tinker, 393 U.S at 512-13.
35. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
36. Id. at 508.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 509.
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire 
fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or 
on the campus, that deviates from the views of another 
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. 
But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and 
our history says that it is this sort of hazardous free-
dom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our 
national strength and of the independence and vigor of 
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively per-
missive, often disputatious, society.40 
Although Justice Hugo Black’s vehement dissent did not dis-
tinguish among Tinker’s various tests, he left no doubt that he as-
signed the majority opinion a flunking mark.  Only days shy of 
celebrating his eighty-third birthday, Black publicly excoriated 
his colleagues by reading aloud a version of his written dissent 
from the bench for some twenty minutes—a judicial performance 
seldom rivaled not only in its length, but also in its vitriol.41  In 
the grand courtroom that invites solemnity, Justice Black used 
sarcastic tones to quote from a disfavored precedent, and con-
cluded his jeremiad with the following declaration: “I want it 
thoroughly known that I disclaim any sentence, any word, any 
part of what the Court does today.”42  The published version of 
Black’s dissent made little effort to conceal his deep displeasure.  
Justice Black ardently supported free speech rights in most con-
texts, but he asserted that the principle had no business in 
schools.43  “It may be that the Nation has outworn the old-fash-
ioned slogan that ‘children are to be seen not heard,’ but one may, 
I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that taxpayers send 
children to school on the premise that at their age they need to 
learn, not teach,” he wrote.44  For Justice Black, Tinker repre-
sented a profound mistake because it “usher[ed] in . . . an entirely 
new era in which the power to control pupils . . . in the United 
40. Id. at 508-09 (internal citations omitted). Justice Stewart and Justice White each
authored brief concurring opinions. See id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 515 
(White, J., concurring). 
41. Fred P. Graham, High Court Upholds a Student Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1969, at 25. 
42. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
43. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517, 521-22 (Black, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 522.
8 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:1 
States is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court,” 
and—if that were not bad enough—also marked “the beginning 
of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country.”45  
Black further contended that those inclined to protest were the 
public schools’ “loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, 
students.”46  In Black’s estimation, Tinker thus did not merely 
permit the inmates to run the asylum, but it thrust the least 
equipped inmates among them into the warden’s role.  
Justice Black did implicitly locate one area of overlap with 
the Court’s opinion in Tinker, as he agreed that the case impli-
cated the importance of citizenship.47  But where the majority en-
tertained a broad conception of citizenship—commanding that 
schools in a disputatious society should not wantonly squelch dis-
senting viewpoints—Justice Black floated a comparatively thin 
conception of citizenship.48  Instead of focusing on larger societal 
considerations, Justice Black’s conception of citizenship resem-
bled the subject found on some elementary students’ report cards, 
which extols respect, deference, and obedience toward school of-
ficials.  “School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral 
and important part of training our children to be good citizens—
to be better citizens,” Black contended.49  In the dissent’s final 
paragraph, he ominously observed: “One does not need to be a 
prophet or the son of a prophet to know that after the Court’s hold-
ing today some students in Iowa schools and indeed in all schools 
will be ready, able, and willing to defy their teachers on practi-
cally all orders.”50  Black insisted that students should mind their 
ps and qs before they worried about expressing their own views.51  
Tinker immediately garnered praise for reining in overzeal-
ous educators who had trampled upon students’ First Amendment 
rights.  The New York Times celebrated Tinker, viewing the opin-
ion, with a clear debt to Fortas’s framing, in almost patriotic 
45. Id. at 515, 518.
46. Id. at 525.
47. Id. at 524.
48. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 525. Justice Harlan also wrote a short dissenting opinion, which would have
accorded broader deference to school authorities than Tinker allowed. See id. at 526 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
51. See id. at 518.
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terms.52  “Freedom of expression—in an open manner by those 
holding minority or unpopular views—is part of the vigor and 
strength of our schools and society,” the Times editorial argued.53  
“So long as it does not obstruct the right of others in the classroom 
or on campus, it must be allowed in this country. If dissent ever 
has to go underground, America will be in real trouble.”54  Law 
professors, even those leaning rightward, generally echoed that 
assessment.55  Professor Charles Alan Wright, a lifelong Repub-
lican who would join President Richard Nixon’s Watergate legal 
team, termed the Tinker decision “an easy one” to rebuff a 
“clearly invalid” school policy: “Constitution or no, it is hardly 
thinkable that we could deny to today’s generation of students 
freedom of expression or procedural fairness.”56  
Much of the early Tinker commentary also conspicuously 
condemned Justice Black’s dissent.  The Washington Post, for ex-
ample, deemed it “strange” that Tinker drew any dissent at all, let 
alone Black’s “harsh” opinion, which it predicted “students of our 
judicial history [would find] puzzl[ing].”57  
Justice Black’s dissent was not, however, rejected in all 
quarters.  In an editorial titled “Revolt Invited in the Romper Set,” 
the Chicago Tribune endorsed Black’s position, as it condemned 
the Supreme Court, “which is always ready to meddle in local 
affairs,” and Tinker for rendering it more difficult to “[m]aintain[] 
discipline and order in the nation’s schools.”58  While the Tribune 
was one of only a handful of major newspapers that criticized 
Tinker, the dissent found a welcoming audience among the many 
people who wrote Justice Black to commend him on the opin-
ion.59  It is hardly surprising that Black’s opinion won the admi-
ration of school officials, in positions ranging from 
52. See Armbands Yes, Miniskirts No, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1969, at 46.
53. .Id.
54. Id.
55. See Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1053, 1086 (1969); Theodore F. Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to 
School, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 61-62 (1969). 
56. Wright, supra note 55, at 1053, 1086.
57. .Freedom of Expression in the Schools, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1969, at A22. The
New York Times called Black’s dissent in Tinker “peppery.” Armbands Yes, Miniskirts No, 
supra note 52, at 46. 
58. Revolt Invited in the Romper Set, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1969, at 20.
59. Johnson, supra note 16, at 486-90.
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superintendent to cafeteria manager.60  But the appeal of Black’s 
position reached beyond its natural constituency.  A physician 
based in Springfield, Illinois, for example, congratulated Black 
for resisting “this [nation’s] new sweeping plague of permissive-
ness,” a term that quite easily could have appeared in the dissent 
itself.61 “[Y]ou speak eloquently my feelings and those of so 
many of my countrymen,” the physician noted.  “I’m sick and in-
tolerant of permissive parents, permissive teachers, permissive 
law enforcement agencies, permissive legislators, and permissive 
courts.”62  
Justice Black’s vehement dissent in Tinker certainly made a 
deep impression on his colleagues, leading Chief Justice Earl 
Warren to remark: “Old Hugo really got hung up in his jock strap 
on that one.”63  What inspired Black’s stridency in this case?  Ac-
cording to one assessment, a searing episode from Black’s famil-
ial life spurred him to adopt this hard line against student 
speech.64  Proponents of this interpretation note that—after the 
oral argument in Tinker, but before the Court issued its decision—
Black’s grandson was suspended for his role in producing an un-
derground newspaper that used intemperate language to criticize 
school administrators.65  When Black learned of his grandson’s 
suspension and that the family was contemplating a lawsuit 
against the school, the Justice penned a letter to his daughter-in-
law condemning the idea in pointed terms.  “[P]ersonally I think 
the school has done exactly right,” he wrote.66  “The time has 
come in this country when it must be known that children cannot 
run the school which they attend at government expense.”67  This 
anecdote contains irresistible appeal, as Black’s frosty private 
60. Id. at 487-88.
61. Id. at 488.
62. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
63. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 592 (2d ed. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted). 
64. See, e.g., CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND
COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 32 (2015) (“Personal considera-
tions may have played a part.”). 
65. .See NEWMAN, supra note 63, at 592.
66. .Id.
67. .Id.
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letter about his grandson seems to foreshadow the public posture 
he would adopt in Tinker.  
Upon deeper reflection, however, it seems mistaken to invest 
too much stock in this episode’s explanatory power for Justice 
Black’s position on student speech.  Some of the reason for cau-
tion on this front surrounds the sequence of events.  Years before 
Tinker arrived at the Court, for instance, Black demonstrated a 
willingness to retreat from his traditionally staunch defense of 
free speech rights when he confronted cases involving the civil 
rights movement’s direct action phase, which can be seen as a 
forerunner of the antiwar movement.68  Similarly, at oral argu-
ment in Tinker, Black appeared deeply skeptical of First Amend-
ment rights for students, something noted in contemporaneous 
media accounts.69  With a tinge of irritation piercing his Alabama 
drawl, Black asked the protesting students’ attorney the following 
question: “Which do you think has the most control in the school 
. . . the pupils or the authorities that are running the school?”70  
More importantly, though, it is misguided to construe Justice 
Black’s dissent in Tinker primarily as a cranky grandfather’s fit 
of pique because that interpretation obscures the prevalence of 
such views among Americans during the late-1960s.  Instead of 
viewing Black’s dissent as the ranting of an elderly codger whose 
mischievous grandson caused him to become unhinged, it seems 
far more accurate to view him as tapping into a deep wellspring 
of cultural anxiety that engulfed the Court’s efforts to extend con-
stitutional rights to students.  Moreover, although some readers 
may intuit that Black’s sentiments from Tinker have disappeared 
in the nearly five decades since the decision, that intuition misses 
the mark; Black’s views continue to claim admirers within soci-
ety, the legal academy, and even on the Supreme Court.  
While some observers perceived Tinker’s outcome as inevi-
table, when assessed from the viewpoint of the 1960s, it seemed 
quite plausible that the Supreme Court could have reached 
68. See id. at 540-47.
69. See Lyle Denniston, High Court Studies Classroom Protests, EVENING STAR, Nov.
13, 1968, at D-16 (noting Justice Black’s cutting questions at oral argument); Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 44-45, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(No. 21) [hereinafter Tinker Transcript]; JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 161. 
70. Tinker Transcript, supra note 69, at 44-45.
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precisely the opposite outcome.  To appreciate how Tinker could 
have resulted in a defeat for students’ First Amendment rights, 
contemplate that no less a personage than the author of the Court’s 
opinion himself viewed the matter as thorny.  When Tinker ini-
tially arrived at the Court, Justice Fortas wrote, “this is a tough 
case” on a law clerk memorandum outlining the students’ petition 
for certiorari.71  Fortas eventually voted to deny the students’ pe-
tition,72 a stance that (if not overcome by his colleagues) would 
have permitted the school officials’ suppression of student speech 
to remain intact from their victory at the circuit court level.  Even 
at oral argument, Fortas’s comments to the students’ lawyer re-
vealed at least some unease at the prospect of finding that the Des 
Moines educators’ actions violated the Constitution: “This gets 
the Supreme Court of the United States pretty deep in the trenches 
of ordinary day to day [school] discipline.”73 
The notion that Tinker was far from an assured triumph for 
student rights finds further support when one contemplates the 
events swirling outside of the Court in the late 1960s.  The Court 
heard oral arguments in Tinker on November 12, 1968—only ten 
weeks after the Democratic National Convention in Chicago was 
overshadowed by demonstrations and violence, and exactly one 
week after Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey for the 
presidency.74  Prior to the election, Nixon’s campaign condemned 
the Supreme Court for its supposedly indulgent treatment of the 
criminal element, and promised to restore “law and order,” a pro-
tean term that encompassed criminal defendants and antiwar pro-
testors alike.75  Against these groups, President Nixon would pur-
port to speak on behalf of the “silent majority,” an assemblage 
that was chiefly defined by its not assembling—in order to protest 
the Vietnam War, or anything else for that matter.76  In a nod to-
ward Nixon’s “silent majority,” Time designated “The Middle 
Americans” its “Man and Woman of the Year” for 1969, and 
71. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 287 (1990).
72. Id.
73. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
74. See Allen Rostron, Intellectual Seriousness and the First Amendment’s Protection
of Free Speech for Students, 81 UMKC L. REV. 635, 637-38 (2013). 
75. See generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO 
JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 24-35 (2011). 
76. Id. at 2 (internal quotations omitted).
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placed an image of a school on its cover to represent a chief con-
cern for these ordinary folks.77  In the accompanying article, the 
Middle Americans were depicted as flaunting an obsessive, flag-
bearing patriotism, and as “fear[ing] they were beginning to lose 
their grip on the country,” as “[o]thers seemed to be taking over—
the liberals, the radicals, the defiant young . . . .”78  Time quoted 
a resident of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, who groused: “Dissent is 
disgusting.  If you have a complaint, write your Congressman or 
the President.  School is to get an education.”79  This statement 
bears an uncanny resemblance to the view offered by the Des 
Moines school officials in Tinker who contended that “schools are 
no place for demonstrations,” and asserted if students “didn’t like 
the way our elected officials were handling things, it should be 
handled with the ballot box and not in the halls of our public 
schools.”80  
During the late 1960s, polling data suggests that more Amer-
icans would have embraced Justice Black’s dissent than Justice 
Fortas’s majority opinion.  In a Harris Poll taken only one month 
after Tinker, fifty-two percent of respondents opposed granting 
rights to student protesters, and only thirty-eight percent of re-
spondents supported granting such rights.81  When Gallup con-
ducted its first comprehensive poll gauging attitudes toward edu-
cation in February 1969, moreover, respondents identified a lack 
of student discipline as the single leading problem confronting the 
77. Man and Woman of the Year: The Middle Americans, TIME, Jan. 5, 1970.
78. Id. at 10. For a useful overview of Tinker’s historical backdrop, see Rostron, supra
note 74, at 638. For insightful examinations of President Nixon’s 1968 campaign and its 
legal implications, see generally MCMAHON, supra note 75, at 17-36; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ 
& LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT (2016); 
RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF 
AMERICA (2008).  For penetrating analysis of this Time issue and its implications for school-
ing debates, see JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO 
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 63-64 
(2010). 
79. Man and Woman of the Year: The Middle Americans, supra note 77, at 13.
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 n. 3 (1969) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
81. Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Freedom of Speech, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 483, 493 (1970)
(The precise question asked: “Do you feel that students have the right to make their protests 
or not?”). 
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nation’s schools.82  Many respondents doubtless would have iden-
tified the behavior at issue in Des Moines, with students disobey-
ing direct orders from their principals, as a cardinal example of 
the breakdown in student discipline that must be corrected.  
In short, Tinker represented a momentous innovation in the 
recognition of students’ constitutional rights.  For the first time, 
the Supreme Court recognized: students retain the essential power 
to communicate their ideas to one another; such communication 
is not extraneous to the educational process, but instead forms an 
integral part of that process; and public schools have an acute re-
sponsibility to tolerate dissident speech, so both the marketplace 
of ideas functions properly and citizens will be prepared to par-
ticipate in the freewheeling debate that characterizes the United 
States.  Tinker’s constitutional contributions to our society would 
deserve to be saluted if they arrived at any time. But that Tinker 
resisted, rather than ratified, the era’s prevailing attitudes on stu-
dent dissent makes those contributions all the more remarkable.  
III. TINKER’S CONTINUING VITALITY
Following Tinker’s defense of student speech in 1969, the 
Supreme Court has handed students a series of high-profile de-
feats in this area.  In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bethel School 
District v. Fraser held that students could be sanctioned for lewd 
speech.83  Two years later, the Court in Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. Kuhlmeier authorized educators to control the content of 
school newspapers, even over the objections of student report-
ers.84  In 2007, the Court in Morse v. Frederick permitted educa-
tors to punish students for speech that could be reasonably con-
strued as promoting illicit drug usage.85  Such decisions have 
provoked many observers over time to express grave doubts about 
whether the First Amendment retains vitality in schools. As early 
as 2000, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky queried: “What’s Left of 
82. A DECADE OF GALLUP POLLS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD EDUCATION 1969-1978 20
(Stanley M. Elam ed. 1978). 
83. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
84. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
85. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
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Tinker?”86  His assessment registered somewhere between not 
much and nothing at all.87  Chemerinsky contended that the Su-
preme Court “views schools as authoritarian institutions,” to 
which it all-too-readily deferred: “[T]he Tinker majority’s ap-
proach to student speech is no longer followed; the subsequent 
cases are much closer to Justice Black’s dissent than to Justice 
Fortas’s majority opinion.”88  Frederick, of course, did nothing to 
tamp down such dire evaluations.  In 2009, Professor Perry Zirkel 
asserted that Fraser and Frederick had “deflected the import of 
the Tinker opinion to the point of practically reversing or, at least, 
effectively compartmentalizing it[,]”89 and a law review article 
likewise contended that the Court’s decisions have “render[ed] 
Tinker negligible to a large extent.”90 
Reports of Tinker’s demise have, however, been greatly ex-
aggerated.  While the Court’s post-Tinker opinions should not be 
dismissed as inconsequential, neither should they be viewed as 
draining student speech of all vitality.  The Supreme Court in Fra-
ser and Frederick did not purport to undercut Tinker’s core con-
tribution: students, typically, continue to possess the right to ex-
press themselves in schools, even if educators dislike their 
messages.  The Court’s subsequent opinions can plausibly be 
viewed as retreating in particular areas—involving speech that is 
lewd, school-sponsored, or pro-drug.91  But it is implausible to 
contend that those decisions indicate that Tinker has been hol-
lowed out entirely, so that only its edifice remains.  To the con-
trary, today’s students enjoy far greater First Amendment protec-
tions than did their counterparts in the pre-Tinker era.92  
Lower courts often issue decisions permitting students to ex-
press themselves, even over the objections of school 
86. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000). 
87. See id. at 529.
88. Id. at 541.
89. Perry A. Zirkel, The Rocket’s Red Glare: The Largely Errant and Deflected Flight
of Tinker, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 597 (2009). 
90. Piotr Banasiak, Morse v. Frederick: Why Content-Based Exceptions, Deference,
and Confusion Are Swallowing Tinker, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1059, 1099 (2009). 
91. .See Banasiak, supra note 89, at 1060-61.
92. See generally Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the
Student Speech Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions—for the Law and for the 
Litigants, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1407 (2011). 
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administrators.  In recent years, for example, the federal judiciary 
has issued opinions vindicating students’ speech rights to: oppose 
President George W. Bush by wearing a T-shirt that refers to him 
as an “International Terrorist”;93 advance gay equality by wearing 
items that read “Gay? Fine by Me,” “I Support Gays,” and “Pro-
Gay Marriage”;94 and support a national breast cancer awareness 
campaign by wearing a bracelet that reads “I ♥ boobies!”95  
After Tinker, moreover, some lower courts have even held 
that student hecklers must not be permitted to veto student 
speech.96  In 2004, for example, a federal appellate court upheld 
a student’s right to thrust his fist in the air as his classmates recited 
the Pledge of Allegiance, even though the school contended that 
other students would react with hostility to his silent protest.97  In 
doing so, the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the notion that 
Tinker must permit hecklers to veto student speech:  
If certain bullies are likely to act violently when a stu-
dent wears long hair, it is unquestionably easy for a 
principal to preclude the outburst by preventing the stu-
dent from wearing long hair.  To do so, however, is to 
sacrifice freedom upon the alt[a]r of order, and allow 
the scope of our liberty to be dictated by the inclinations 
of the unlawful mob . . . .  The fact that other students 
might take such a hairstyle as an incitement to violence 
is an indictment of those other students, not long hair 
. . . .  While the same constitutional standards do not al-
ways apply in public schools as on public streets, we 
cannot afford students less constitutional protection 
simply because their peers might illegally express disa-
greement through violence instead of reason.98  
One particularly notable anti-heckler’s veto decision oc-
curred in 1980 when a high school senior in Rhode Island named 
Aaron Fricke wished to bring another young man to prom as his 
93. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
94. Gillman v. Sch. Bd. for Holmes Cty., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
95. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2013).
96. For the foundational work coining “the heckler’s veto,” see HARRY KALVEN, JR.,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (1965). 
97. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2004).
98. Id. Lower courts have frequently vindicated the desire of students to sit during the
Pledge of Allegiance. See Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade Cty., 314 F. Supp. 285, 
294-95 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
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date.99  School administrators responded that Fricke could not do 
so because they could not guarantee his safety against attacks 
from his classmates—an assertion that had at least some factual 
basis because the school recently witnessed physical altercations 
over sexual orientation.100  Nevertheless, the district court invali-
dated the school’s response as impermissibly infringing upon 
Fricke’s First Amendment expressive rights.101  To rule other-
wise, the court explained, would endorse “mob rule,” and “com-
pletely subvert free speech in the schools by granting other stu-
dents a ‘heckler’s veto,’ allowing them to decide through—
prohibited and violent methods—what speech will be heard.”102  
In 2000, a Massachusetts Superior Court relied upon that decision 
to invalidate a school’s effort to prohibit a transgendered student 
from wearing clothing to school that corresponded to her gender 
identity.103  
Perhaps even more revealing of Tinker’s legacy than these 
judicial opinions, though, are the many instances in recent years 
where educators have initially sought to suppress student speech 
only to realize that their stance cannot be squared with the Con-
stitution.  Following this pattern, school districts have retreated 
from efforts to prohibit students from: displaying a pin featuring 
the Palestinian flag;104 expressing pro-life views by wearing a T-
shirt that reads “Abortion Kills Kids”;105 and voicing solidarity 
with the Black Lives Matter movement by wearing “I Can’t 
Breathe” T-shirts in honor of the dying words that Eric Garner 
wheezed as a police officer choked him.106  If Tinker were truly 
as feeble as some observers maintain, educators in these exam-
ples—and many others besides—would have squelched these in-
stances of student expression with impunity. 
99. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.R.I. 1980).
100. Id. at 383-84.
101. Id. at 388.
102. Id. at 387.
103. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 2000). 
104. Tamar Lewin, High School Tells Student to Remove Antiwar Shirt, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb 26, 2003, at A12. 
105. John Carlson, Anti-Abortion Message Meets Zero Tolerance, DES MOINES
REGISTER, May 4, 2005, at 11A. 
106. Veronica Rocha, Players Allowed to Wear Protest Shirts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2015, at AA4. 
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While Tinker is best construed as retaining vitality, that po-
sition should be not mistaken for complacency, contending that 
all is well with the First Amendment in schools.  Today, two pri-
mary areas stand out as demanding significant interventions.  
First, although some judges have wisely rejected hecklers’ efforts 
to veto speech, such opinions are sporadic rather than universal.  
Lower courts still too frequently indulge that practice and rely 
upon related techniques in order to uphold schools’ efforts to si-
lence student speech on contentious issues.  Second, lower courts 
have permitted school officials to exert excessive authority over 
student speech that is articulated off-campus. 
Lower courts’ mistreatment of heckler’s veto cases poses a 
grave threat to student expression.  Federal courts too often permit 
schools to stifle student expression of views on divisive topics—
including on questions of national significance.  Consider a few 
examples. In 2007, a federal district court in southern Texas up-
held a school’s decision to prohibit students from wearing T-
shirts that read “Border Patrol” and “We Are Not Criminals” as 
methods of expressing competing positions on unauthorized im-
migration.107  In 2014, the Ninth Circuit upheld a northern Cali-
fornia school’s decision to prohibit students from wearing clothes 
featuring images of the American flag on the day celebrating 
Cinco de Mayo.108  The courts in those two cases found that the 
schools’ actions were justified because the contested speech had 
generated angry reactions and even threats from classmates—
classic instances of the heckler’s veto at work.109  Even when 
schools cannot persuasively claim that student speech caused any 
tempers to flare or disruption of school activities, however, courts 
have nonetheless sometimes upheld bans on expression about di-
visive topics.  In 2006, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
southern California school’s decision to prohibit a student from 
wearing a T-shirt, in protest of a school-sanctioned Day of Si-
lence, that read “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED 
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” and “HOMOSEXUALITY 
IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 1:27.’”110  In 2010, moreover, the Sixth 
107. Madrid v. Anthony, 510 F. Supp. 2d. 425, 427-28 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
108. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 767, 781 (9th Cir. 2014).
109. Madrid, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 435-36; Dariano, 767 F.3d at 777-78.
110. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Circuit upheld a Tennessee school’s ban of clothes featuring the 
Confederate flag when a student wore a T-shirt with the contro-
versial emblem, and text reading: “If you have a problem with 
this flag you need a history lesson.”111 
The desire of schools to curtail speech on these acrimonious 
topics is certainly understandable.  Few topics have demonstrated 
the ability to stir passions more intensely in recent years than un-
authorized immigration, cultural assimilation among Mexican 
Americans, the quest for gay equality, and the Confederate flag’s 
relationship to racial subordination.  Nevertheless, the courts, in 
my view, erred by permitting these speech prohibitions in all four 
of these instances.  Students in the above cases who disagreed 
with the messages they believed their classmates were conveying 
should have either informed them of their disagreement, or—if 
they could not manage to do so in a composed fashion—simply 
ignored them. In the marketplace of ideas, boycotts too can some-
times be an effective instrument for change.  
Contemplate each of the four cases in turn.  While there can 
be no doubt that the topic of immigration reform generates strong 
feelings and that some students on both sides of the debate may 
well feel affronted by those T-shirts, schools should not take it 
upon themselves to ban this sort of communication on this vital 
topic.  If students either threaten their classmates or if an outbreak 
of violence occurs, the students who are responsible for actually 
causing those disruptions should be disciplined, not the speaker.  
That same analysis pertains to the students who threatened vio-
lence against classmates who displayed the American flag on 
Cinco de Mayo.  I maintain that view even though I well under-
stand that some celebrants may genuinely feel aggrieved by class-
mates who display Old Glory on the lone day during the entire 
school year set aside to honor Mexican heritage.  In both in-
stances, however, rewarding angry hecklers by silencing speakers 
incentivizes students in precisely the wrong manner.  
The remaining two cases present closer calls.  The student 
who opposed the Day of Silence sought to express his religious-
based opposition to the school’s embrace of gay equality; he 
111. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 329, 342 (6th Cir. 2010); Complaint at 3, Defoe v.
Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (No. 06CV00450). 
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expressed that position without resorting to epithets, and it is dif-
ficult to know how he could have expressed his particular view 
(which is distinct from expressing pride in heterosexuality) in a 
way that educators would have deemed permissible.  Although I 
vehemently disagree with the T-shirt’s stance and regard it as an-
imated by antigay sentiment, I also believe that a school should 
not make it virtually impossible to express a particular view-
point—especially when that opinion opposes the school’s own 
position.  Finally, the Confederate flag case presents, in my esti-
mation, the most vexing case of all.  I associate that flag primarily 
with an expression of racial hostility, and for that reason detest it.  
Nevertheless, I do not believe that it usually connotes a threat of 
violence, as is true with burning crosses.  Ultimately, my assess-
ment that this school’s ban on the Confederate flag should not 
have been permitted to stand is due in no small part to the accom-
panying action it took to make that ban viable.  To comply with 
the requirement for viewpoint neutrality, the school also barred 
paraphernalia promoting Malcolm X.112  While it is far from clear 
that the opposite view of the Confederate flag is actually commu-
nicated by a Malcolm X hat—rather than, say, the American 
flag—it does seem clear that public schools are spectacularly ill-
suited to making that determination.  
Consider a few more broadly applicable reasons why up-
holding these bans on student speech may have been unwise in 
these cases.  First, validating these bans sends the message that 
particular groups of students may be more psychologically fragile 
and lacking in self-control than actually seems warranted.  Sec-
ond, because the bans apply only within school, it seems im-
portant to remember that these groups of students may well en-
counter versions of this speech outside of school—and that they 
may be less adept at navigating those situations because the ex-
perience is unfamiliar.  Third, the bans seem unlikely to rid the 
school of the disfavored message because clever students can lo-
cate alternate phrasing or symbols to serve as a substitute for the 
prohibited speech. (Contemplate, for example, how the Confed-
erate flag could be swapped for iconic images of Robert E. Lee.)  
Fourth, the bans themselves may even prove counterproductive 
112. Defoe, 625 F.3d at 337.
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because they render particular expression taboo, which will for 
some subset of students elevate its status and make it more attrac-
tive, precisely because it is forbidden in school.   
An additional area of concern involves the ability of educa-
tors to sanction students for comments made off-campus but 
online, whose effects may eventually be felt within the school—
an issue of ever-increasing significance during the internet era.  
To date, the Supreme Court has studiously evaded this question, 
despite being presented with numerous viable opportunities to 
consider it.113  The Court’s reticence on this front seems regretta-
ble because ample evidence suggests that lower courts have gen-
erally taken an unduly deferential approach to articulating legal 
standards for school regulations regarding off-campus speech.114  
The downside of the judiciary’s lax approach to protecting 
students’ off-campus speech is seldom more apparent than when 
students use harsh language to criticize school officials.  In one 
particularly egregious example, the Second Circuit in 2011 found 
that a Connecticut high school did not violate Avery Doninger’s 
clearly established First Amendment rights when it punished the 
eleventh grader in her capacity as Junior Class Secretary for call-
ing school administrators “douchebags” in a blog post written 
from her home during non-school hours.115  The dispute arose 
when an administrator informed students that “Jamfest,” an an-
nual battle-of-the-bands concert, could not be held in the school’s 
new auditorium on the upcoming weekend as previously 
planned.116  That evening, Doninger took to her personal blog—
unaffiliated with the high school’s website—and encouraged 
readers to contact school administrators (whom she termed “the 
douchebags in central office”) to register their displeasure with 
the changed plans for Jamfest.117  Doninger’s post, along with an 
email campaign that she coordinated, succeeded in motivating 
many people to call the school; the unusually high volume of 
phone calls, in turn, caused some tumult within the central 
113. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2015).
114. Id. at 396.
115. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 340, 357 (2d Cir. 2011).
116. Id. at 339.
117. Id. at 340-41.
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office.118  After the school learned of the blog, it punished Don-
inger by prohibiting her from running for election as Senior Class 
Secretary as she had intended.119  Nevertheless, the federal appel-
late court refused to find that the school’s sanctioning of Doninger 
violated her First Amendment rights, reasoning that “it was ob-
jectively reasonable for school officials to conclude that Don-
inger’s behavior was potentially disruptive of student government 
functions (such as the organization of Jamfest) and that Doninger 
was not free to engage in such behavior while serving as a class 
representative.”120  
Fortunately, federal appellate courts have not universally 
rubberstamped schools’ efforts to sanction students for off-cam-
pus speech that criticizes educators.  In 2011, the Third Circuit 
found a free speech violation when a Pennsylvania school sus-
pended an eighth-grade student—identified by the courts as 
J.S.—for creating a vulgar, absurd MySpace121  The online profile
for the Alabama principal J.S. dubbed “M-Hoe”—which she cre-
ated from her home computer, and made accessible only to ap-
proved users—contained the following greeting:
HELLO CHILDREN.  yes.  it’s your oh so wonderful, 
hairy, expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this 
world with a small dick PRINCIPAL.  I have come to 
myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principals 
to be just like me.  I know, I know, you’re all thrilled.  
Another reason I came to myspace is because—I am 
keeping an eye on you students (whom I care for so 
much).  For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t 
in my school, I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long 
walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but 
not least my darling wife who looks like a man.122 
In the section listing M-Hoe’s general interests, J.S. included 
the following: “detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain, 
spending time with my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, 
my golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students and their 
118. Id. at 341.
119. Id. at 342.
120. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 351.
121. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011).
122. Id. at 921 (original modifications incorporated).
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parents.”123  Despite the precautions J.S. took limiting access to 
the profile, and the absence of evidence that it significantly dis-
turbed school proceedings, her principal nevertheless suspended 
J.S. for ten days after he learned of its existence.124  The Third 
Circuit, however, invalidated the suspension, reasoning: “The 
profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seri-
ously, and no one did.  Thus, it was clearly not reasonably fore-
seeable that J.S.’s speech would create a substantial disruption or 
material interference in school.”125  As the Third Circuit further 
explained in a companion case released the same day: “It would 
be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the 
guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and con-
trol his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that 
child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”126 
The finding of a First Amendment violation here seems 
plainly appropriate with respect to J.S.’s suspension.  As the Third 
Circuit suggests, schools should not rely upon the existence of the 
internet to render actionable students’ off-campus disparagement 
of educators—particularly when the critiques are clearly satirical.  
At the same time, though, if forced to select only Doninger’s post 
or J.S.’s profile as meriting First Amendment protection, it seems 
difficult to escape the conclusion that the First Amendment 
should be understood as more readily protecting Doninger than 
J.S. On first impression, Doninger’s protest over “Jamfest” may 
seem to involve a frivolous issue; the Constitution does not rec-
ognize a fundamental right to rock out.  But Doninger’s protest 
should not be dismissed because it can also be viewed as raising 
important questions of democratic representation and the im-
portance of government accountability.  Recall that Doninger’s 
speech involved an issue that directly criticized the governance of 
her school, and encouraged her classmates and fellow citizens in 
effect to petition the government about a grievance, a right that 
receives independent protection under the First Amendment.  
Moreover, although the Second Circuit appeared to regard Don-
inger’s punishment of being banned from serving in the student 
123. Id. at 920.
124. Id. at 921-23.
125. Id. at 930.
126. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011).
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government as lighter than a suspension, it seems plausible that 
this particular sanction may actually be graver in this context.  
The school is in effect sanctioning Doninger for daring to speak 
out against the local government by stripping her of the ability to 
occupy a formal leadership position and also prohibiting her 
classmates from voting for her.  Finally, regarding the language 
itself, Doninger’s usage of “douchebag,” while pejorative, com-
monly appeared on network television shows, and by the time that 
she used the term it had largely been severed from a connection 
to anything literal. In contrast to Doninger’s speech, J.S.’s mock 
profile was by her own testimony designed to amuse because it 
was “outrageous,” not to communicate any serious idea, and used 
shocking language to achieve its intended effect.  It seems down-
right bizarre to think that Avery Doninger would have had better 
luck prevailing on her First Amendment claim if, in addition to 
calling school officials “douchebags,” she remarked upon their 
genitalia, suggested they were pedophiles, and insulted their rel-
atives’ physical appearances.127  
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the sometimes-ugly content of student speech today, 
some readers may now have greater sympathy for the notion that 
Justice Black voiced long ago in Tinker, contending students do 
not know enough to express views that enjoy First Amendment 
protection in schools.  Judge Richard Posner offered a somewhat 
softened version of this claim in 2008, when he wrote an opinion 
for the Seventh Circuit that voiced deep hesitation about the wis-
dom of having the federal judiciary review free speech determi-
nations made by educators, even as he sided with the student in 
the immediate case.128  “A heavy federal constitutional hand on 
the regulation of student speech by school authorities would make 
little sense,” Judge Posner posited, because “[t]he contribution 
that kids can make to the marketplace in ideas and opinions is 
modest.”129   
127. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 921; see also Edward Wyatt, It Turns Out You Can Say
That on Television, Over and Over, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1. 
128. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 671-72
(7th Cir. 2008). 
129. Id. at 671.
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This effort to diminish the importance of conferring First 
Amendment rights on students, however, elicited a powerful, 
rousing response from Judge Ilana Rovner:  
Youth are often the vanguard of social change.  Anyone 
who thinks otherwise has not been paying attention to 
the civil rights movement, the women’s rights move-
ment, the anti-war protests for Vietnam and Iraq, and 
the [2008] presidential primaries where the youth voice 
and the youth vote are having a substantial impact . . . .  
The young adults to whom the majority refers as “kids” 
and “children” are either already eligible, or a few short 
years away from being eligible to vote, to contract, to 
marry, to serve in the military, and to be tried as adults 
in criminal prosecutions. To treat them as children in 
need of protection from controversy . . . is contrary to 
the values of the First Amendment.130  
Students, as Judge Rovner attests, have made valuable con-
tributions to the nation’s marketplace of ideas, and the school it-
self has often been an important site for exchanging ideas on the 
topic of the day.  As the preceding material establishes, moreover, 
the judiciary played a critical role in ensuring that students retain 
the ability to speak out on these issues—even if educators them-
selves have initially dismissed their statements as incoherent, in-
correct, or irrelevant.  When schools have sought to prevent stu-
dents from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War—
when educators have tried to stop students from revealing their 
sexual orientation through their prom dates or their gender iden-
tity through their clothing choices—it seems clear that majoritar-
ian sentiment within those communities would have supported the 
schools.  While many observers now view those student messages 
as presenting valued input to our schools and our polity, they were 
not always so considered at the outset.  Yet courts nevertheless 
prohibited educators from banning those contested student mes-
sages.  The First Amendment provides space to disfavored ideas 
today in the event that they may, over time, flourish and perhaps 
eventually become the dominant view.  Make no mistake, though: 
students will not invariably avail themselves of the space created 
by the First Amendment to articulate ideas that ultimately become 
130. Id. at 677-78 (Rovner, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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the wave of the future.  Instead, much of what students say will 
no doubt seem puerile, spiteful, ill-conceived, and wrong-
headed—initial impressions that the passage of time will only ce-
ment. On this score, though, it is essential to appreciate that 
speech from students has no small amount in common with 
speech from adults. 
